RAND研究所、IFRIがミクロネシア海洋安全保障事業を取り上げてくれた事は感謝しているが、この事業に一切関与していない日本人専門家から嘘と作り話を聞かされ、そのまま書いている事は、今後のインド太平洋の海洋安全保障を理解し進める上で大きな問題になるので現場で実際に動かしてきた唯一人の担当者である私が書いておく責任があると考えている。
机上で安全保障を議論するのと現場で安全保障事業を進めるのは全く違う。
私がミクロネシアを選んだのはかつての日本領で現在も良好な関係が続いていること。２番目に米国の戦略地域であり日米同盟を動かす地域とし最適であること。３番目は当時ハワイの太平洋司令軍は認識していたが海洋安全保障始め当該地域が安定していないこと。そして一番重要なのがミクロネシア地域から強い海洋管理支援要請があったことである。
パラオのクアルテイ大統領補佐官との会話で、太平洋司令軍のキーティング司令官達が日本の協力を求めていたことを知った。さらにミクロネシア三カ国大統領から米国政府に確認の書状を出してもらい、当時の国務次官浦クリストファー・ヒルから日本のミクロネシア地域海洋安全保障への関与を承諾する書状を受領することができた。
いざ実行に移すべく米国沿岸警備隊のメンバーと現地を回ったところ、強い留意を示したのが豪州王立海軍であった。東京で開催した会議では豪州外務省がPIFのBoe宣言を盾に日本の外務省と組んで止めにかかった。これに対しミクロネシア連邦の大臣が
「我が国の主権を無視するのか！」と怒った。
島嶼国の主権を無視する豪州の態度は今に始まったことではない。問題はその豪州が地域の安全保障をきちんと支援・管理できていない事にある。
偶然にも2008年、私がミクロネシア海洋安全保障事業を立ち上げようとした時、豪州政府は長年支援してきたPacific Patrol Boat Programを中止する方向で動いていた。島嶼国に監視船を供与し現地の人材育成をすれば自立すると考えていたようだが、十分な国家予算がない島嶼国政府が燃料費も人件費も賄えず自ら海洋管理をする事は難しい。Pajon女史の報告書に米国が監視船を提供しているという嘘が書かれている。90年代始め頃から米国は冷戦終結後この地域から姿を消している。
ミクロネシア海洋安全保障事業の動きを止めようとしたのは日本の外務省だけではなかった。水産庁も当初は懸念を示し、わざわざ違法操業の実態を説明しにきた位である。さらに肝心の海上保安庁は元国交相審議官とは言え、退任した羽生氏の判断で動かされる事に大きな反感を抱き当初は協力的ではなかった。財団が供与する船舶に問題があることを指摘したのは海上保安庁である。彼らの対応に変化があったのは2015年の天皇皇后両陛下パラオ訪問で海上保安庁の船が宿泊先として利用される事になったあたりである。パラオの海を知る海上保安庁の存在が明確になった。
RANDやIFRIに作り話を伝えた日本人の罪は大きい。残念ながら日本政府に太平洋の海洋安全保障戦略はない。2017年、安倍政権に私が提案する機会を得たことで海上自衛隊が一気に動き出したが、内閣府の総合海洋政策本部は国交省が主導しており、安全保障政策が議論できないままでいる。この点すら押さえず、嘘の報告書を書いていたら国際的安全保障に害悪があるだけである。
次回は国交省・日本財団の造船利権と水産庁の取締船の話を書く。
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All Japan government against Micronesia MARSEC initiative
I am grateful that the RAND Institute and IFRI have taken up the Micronesian Maritime Security Project. However, it is unfortunate that some parts of the article are written as they are by fake Japanese experts who are not involved in this project.
This could be a major problem for understanding and promoting maritime security in the Indo-Pacific in the future. As the only person in charge of the actual operation on the ground, I feel I have a responsibility to write about it.
Discussing security on the desk is completely different from carrying out security projects in the field.
I chose Micronesia because it is a former Japanese territory with which we still have positive relations. Secondly, I chose Micronesia because it is a strategic area for the United States and is the most suitable area to move the US-Japan alliance. Third, the Pacific Command in Hawaii recognised at the time that the region was not stable, including in terms of maritime security. Fourth, most importantly, there was a strong request from the Micronesian countries for Japan’s support.
I learned that Admiral Keating and his team of PACOM were genuinely seeking Japan's cooperation through my conversation with Palau Chief of Staff Kuartei. In addition, the Presidents of the three Micronesian countries sent letters of confirmation to the US Government who has responsibility of this region, and I was able to receive a letter from Christopher Hill, then Assistant Secretary of State, agreeing to Japan's involvement in the maritime security of the Micronesian region.
It was the Royal Australian Navy that came out to stop it after I had toured the area with members of the USCG. At a meeting in Tokyo, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs teamed up with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stop our project, using the PIF's Boe Declaration as a shield. In response, the Minister of the Federated States of Micronesia once angrily said, " Are you ignoring our sovereignty?"
Australia's attitude of ignoring the sovereignty of island states is nothing new. The problem lies in Australia's failure to properly manage regional security.
In 2008, when I was about to launch the Micronesia Maritime Security Project, the Australian Government was moving to stop the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which it had supported for many decades. Ms Pajon's report contains a incorrect fact that the US was providing the surveillance vessels. The US had disappeared from the region since the end of the Cold War, i.e. early 90s.
Australia thought that if they provided surveillance vessels to the island countries and trained local personnel, they would become self-reliant, but it is difficult for the governments of the island countries to manage their own oceans without national budget for thefuel and personnel etc.
It was not only the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that tried to stop the Micronesian Maritime Security Project, but also the Japan Fisheries Agency, which initially expressed concern and explain the reality of illegal operations. Furthermore, the JCG, which is a key player in the project, was initially uncooperative because of its hostility to being told what to do by the retired Hanyu, even though he was a former vice minister of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(MLIT). It was the JCG that pointed out that there were problems with the vessels provided by the Nippon Foundation. Their response changed in 2015, when a JCG ship was used as accommodation during the visit of the Emperor and Empress to Palau. The JCG's knowledge of Palau's waters became important.
The Japanese are largely guilty of providing fictional stories to RAND and IFRI. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government does not have a Pacific maritime security knowledge, policy and strategy; the Maritime Self-Defence Force moved quickly in 2018 when I had the opportunity to propose one to the Abe Government, but the Cabinet Office's Headquarters for Ocean Policy is led by the MLIT, with no security policy to discuss. If this point is not addressed and a false report is written, it will only harm even international security.
In my next article, I will write about the shipbuilding concessions of the MLIT and Nippon Foundation and the Fisheries Agency's surveillance vessels.
