現在米国で活発に議論されている自由連合協定を理解するには戦後、国連憲章の11、12、13章にある信託統治制度を理解する事が必要である。そして連盟の委任統治制度も、なのだが。。
信託統治に関する良質な議論を国際法学者のHans Kelsenが150頁にも渡り国連憲章分析の本に書いていのを以前紹介した。今回は国際政治学者のERNST B. HAASが29歳の時、博士号を取った1952年翌年、29歳の論文。インターネットでアクセスできるがPDFなのでwordに落とした。しかし文字化けがすごくて終日かけて修正した。それでもまだ間違いはあると思う。見つけた方は教えてください。
政治学者 エルネスト・ハース 1938年、ナチス・ドイツの迫害から逃れアメリカ合衆国に移住。1952年、コロンビア大学より博士号取得。国際統合論における新機能主義の提唱者として有名。後年、研究の関心は、ナショナリズム研究へ広がる。（ウィキより）
THE ATTEMPT TO TERMINATE COLONIALISM: THE ATTEMPT TO TERMINATE COLONIALISM: ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
ERNST B. HAAS
I. The Logic of Compromise
To the contemporary liberal humanitarian the acceptance of the League Mandate System by the world's chief colonial powers signified the advent of a New Deal for dependent areas in which the older and baser motives of empire were defeated even if not completely eliminated. To the con temporary mind impressed with the prevalence of power politics, however, the acceptance of the Mandate System signified nothing of the kind. It merely represented a new form of compromise between clashing imperial powers who sought to remove one source of friction by recourse to "internationalization".1
In terms of the motivations of the statesmen who accepted the supervisory machinery of the League for the areas seized from Germany and Turkey in 1918 neither explanation is wholly applicable.3 Rather, the Mandate System found ready acceptance primarily because it served as a suitable compromise solution in four distinct motivational dilemmas faced by British and French leaders. Firstly, there existed the need, within the domestic British political picture, to reconcile the Liberal and Labor groups with the Conservatives on colonial policy. The former insisted on a policy of "no annexations" and urged that the British Empire was already too large for efficient administration, while the latter demanded annexation of the key African, Middle Eastern and Pacific areas. Secondly, the Mandate System managed to bridge the gap between wartime promises to the Arabs for independence and the Tory and French demand for unilateral control over the vital communications routes and oil fields of the Middle East. Thirdly, the granting of "C" Mandates to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa appeased the land hunger of these Dominions and saddled them with a minimum of international control while pro forma the British Empire was not expanded and the "no annexations" pledge honored. Thus harmony within the Commonwealth was maintained at the time when it was most needed, i.e. at the point in history when the Dominions achieved the right to conduct their own foreign relations. And fourthly, the Mandate System was an acceptable compromise between the liberal humanitarianism of Woodrow Wilson, who sought to strike a blow against further colonial expansion of any kind, and the strategic and economic motives of French and British groups which had historically been identified with expansion and who did not want to stop in 1919. Thus, rather than signifying the victory of one set of motives, the acceptance of the Mandate System was due to the necessity of finding com promises between clashing aspirations.
What were the chief motives which needed reconciliation? In the realm of ideology the chief impetus for acceptance came from the liberal humanitarians who identified service to native progress with international control; they were opposed by the conservative humanitarians who were most willing to admit the paramount duty of the metropolitan country to serve native interests first but without supervision by the League. The conservatives saw no inconsistency between native progress and special strategic and economic privileges for the metropolitan country. In the field of strategic bases and communications, by contrast, the two schools were in agreement on principle. Strategic areas were to be retained under national control. However, the liberal forces sought to utilize the Mandate principle for this purpose, while the conservatives preferred unfettered annexation. In the realm of economics, finally, the liberals sought to realize a measure of free trade through the introduction of the Open Door in colonies while the conservatives preferred annexation in order to maintain protectionism and national privileges in investment. These clashing aspirations were represented not only on the domestic political level but on the inter-Commonwealth and inter-allied levels as well. As indicated above, the acceptance of the Mandate System was due to the need for reconciliation between them.
It is the purpose of this article to explore the motivations which under lay the acceptance of the Trusteeship System in 1945. The analysis will proceed on the hypothesis that the motivational forces which existed in 1918 still prevailed at the time of the San Francisco Conference, though perhaps in modified form. Furthermore, an additional motivation must be considered in the contemporary setting of the problem: the aspirations and demands of areas which in 1919 were colonies but in which a lively sense of nationalism had come to the fore by 1945. The demands of erst while colonial nations may have called for more reconciliation than had been true of any of the motives prevalent in 1919.
ERNST B. HAAS is Instructor in Political Science, University of California (Berkeley); previously a member of the Committee on International Relations, University of Chicago; completed his graduate work at Columbia University, 1952; and has previously contributed to Political Science Quarterly and Columbia Journal of International Affairs.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given by Mr. Leonard C. Rowe in the preparation of this article.
1 See, e.g., H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (Washington, 1948) in which the power political interpretation of the acceptance of both the Mandate and Trusteeship Systems is used.
2 These points are elaborated in some detail in my article "The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System", International Organization, Vol. VI, no. 4.
II Acceptance and Liberalism in the United States
It was liberal opinion in the United Kingdom which took the lead in pressing for the "no annexations" policy in 1917 and it was again liberal opinion which insisted on a "New Deal" for colonies in 1942 and 1943. However, it was primarily American sources which furnished the impetus and they now demanded far more than merely international supervision over colonial administration. The issue raised during the second World War involved nothing short of emancipation of colonial peoples from foreign rule and the inauguration of an internationally controlled colonial policy aimed at preparing dependent areas for independence. Church groups, labor unions, and professional organizations hailed the section of the Atlantic Charter which declared that "they [the United States and the United Kingdom] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Numerous spokesmen, including Henry Wallace, demanded the immediate liquidation of colonial empires, and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace concluded that "the whole of the continent of Africa (apart from . . . the Union of South Africa) and the whole of the Polynesian Island group now under colonial administration, should cease to be regarded as projections of Western power interests and be placed under varying forms of international administration and supervision . . . ". A group of five hundred Protestant leaders pressed for the adoption of such a scheme at the San Francisco conference and urged the United States delegation that "we can find no moral grounds to support the acquisition of bases by a single nation, first, through forthright annexation, or, second, under the guise of trusteeship. Either procedure would violate a pledge made in the Atlantic Charter."3
With the condemnation of colonialism on moral grounds President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull had no quarrel. Both men, but especially Hull, were in the forefront of those who pleaded for the in auguration of a colonial New Deal. Thus Hull said on July 23,1942:
We have always believed — and we believe today — that all peoples, without distinction of race, color or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment. We have always sought — and we seek today — to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations. .. . It has been our purpose in the past — and will remain our purpose in the future — to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples, who by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.4
At the same time a committee was created within the Department of State to prepare recommendations for American policy along these lines. While opposing the immediate granting of independence to all dependent' areas, Hull nevertheless favored an international administrative organ with jurisdiction over all colonies to prepare them for independence. Hull soon retreated from this position but both he and Roosevelt were adamant in insisting that the Atlantic Charter be applied to colonies as well as to states conquered by the Axis, despite British objections to this interpretation." Liberal humanitarianism again found expression in the first official policy recommendations on trusteeship, submitted by Hull to Roosevelt on March 9, 1943:
it is the duty and purpose of those of the United Nations which have, owing to past events become charged with responsibilities for the future of colonial areas to cooperate fully with the peoples of such areas toward their becoming qualified for independent national status.
Regional organs, on the model of the Caribbean Commission, composed of the imperial states, other interested states and representatives of the natives, were to set dates for full independence and prepare the populations for this status. Furthermore, some areas occupied by enemy forces and torn from their former rulers were not to be restored to their European masters after the war, but speedily prepared for independence by an International Trusteeship Administration.6
3 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Preliminary Report and Monographs, in International Conciliation, No. 369, April 1941. p. 201, p. 519. Also National Conference Christians and Jews Uncoil Memos, No. 3, May 16, 1945.
4 Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, Department of State, Publication 3580 (Washington, 1950), hereafter cited as Notter p.109.
5 Ibid., p. 110. Cordell Hull Memoirs (New York 1948), vol. II, p. 1598-1599.
6 Notter, op. cit., p. 470-472. Hull, op. cit., p. 1236-1237.
III Trusteeship as a Non-Ideological Compromise Formula in the United States
Liberal humanitarianism thus took the initiative in the creation of the postwar Trusteeship System. But even though Hull and Roosevelt shared these convictions, they constitute by no means the only motivations under lying American policy. Roosevelt considered world peace unattainable unless colonial nationalism was appeased in time and future areas of conflict thus reduced. Hull, always preoccupied with free trade, saw in the independence of colonies an excellent wedge for the ending of imperial preference systems. Nor were these the only economic and security considerations which commended the trusteeship principle to the Roosevelt Administration. Roosevelt thought of trusteeship in terms of a device to accommodate a variety of international troubles not necessarily related to encouraging the independence of colonial peoples. "The area he mentioned," noted Cordell Hull, "ranged from the Baltic to Ascension Island . . . and to Hongkong," Indo-China was to be a trust area primarily in order to keep future French Governments from giving military privileges to Japan, as the Vichy regime had done after 1940. Hongkong was to be a free port under trusteeship in order to satisfy Chinese claims and British interests. Similarly, the Kuriles, Dakar, "some points" in Liberia and the Netherlands Indies might be internationalized because of their general importance. Korea was to become a trust area apparently to forestall the establishment of a Soviet regime, which Harriman feared if Korea were to become independent.' That United States security considerations were never lacking in these motivations is made plain by Hull's conclusion that American trusteeship responsibilities should be confined to the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific.8
And, of course, the issue of Pacific bases soon gained prominence in Roosevelt's thinking. Like Hull, he thought that American need for the mandated islands should not find expression through outright annexation. He feared that such American action would set a bad precedent for the Russians and Hull noted that "our acquisition of these islands estopped us from objecting to similar acquisitions by other nations." But Roosevelt never denied the need for keeping the islands under United States control. As early as July 10, 1944 he wrote to the Joint Chiefs that I am working on the idea that the United Nations will ask the United States to act as a Trustee for the Japanese mandated islands."
And in March of 1945 Roosevelt made it clear that though sovereignty over the islands would be vested in the United Nations, "we would be requested by them to exercise complete trusteeship for the purpose of world security." While he objected to Australian demands to annex New Guinea outright, he favored the establishment of American bases in New Caledonia under trusteeship principles. Clearly, the humanitarian motivation was not the only one. To the United States, the trusteeship principle afforded a convenient tool for acquiring control over strategically desirable areas without seeming to violate the pledges of the Atlantic Charter.
Whether these non-humanitarian considerations or British coolness; toward the first drastic American trusteeship proposals brought about a] changed approach cannot be ascertained. Certain it is that the Department of State advocated "self-government" and not "independence" for trust areas after July of 1943 and reduced the power of the proposed international colonial authority."10 In the "Possible Plan" for international organization, prepared for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the retreat is in full evidence. International supervision "might be extended to any territories for which assistance is requested by member states having control over such territories" but a priori it was to apply only to mandates and areas detached from enemy states. With the exception of the "strategic trust" provisions the plan here submitted was almost identical with the one finally submitted to UNCIO. 11
But to the War and Navy departments this compromise was unacceptable. Forrestal opposed even the mild trusteeship proposals of the Possible Plan and on the eve of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference informed Stettinius that "it seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrangements that there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated Islands." Consequently, as the Joint Chiefs strongly supported Forrestal's objections and as Henry L. Stimson added his doubts of the wisdom of the proposed arrangements, the United States delegation at Dumbarton Oaks refrained from submitting its trusteeship scheme to the Soviet and British delegates. The deep division of opinion within the U.S. Government prevented the assertion of the Hull-Roosevelt outlook.13 Nor was this rift healed by the time of UNCIO. Determined to iron out domestic differences of opinion, the President instructed the warring cabinet members to agree on a joint formula by means of inter-departmental consultations on trusteeship. Consultations took place during the winter of 1944-1945 but on March 13, 1945, Stimson could still "repeat his concern about the trusteeship concept and he told the Secretary of State he thought he would in due course have to get rid of the gentleman in his Department who was the sponsor of this idea."13 Stimson called the trusteeship idea a "quixotic gesture" and at the time of Yalta argued against raising the issue at all until the Soviet Union had committed itself to entering the Pacific War. And on the eve of UNCIO he and Forrestal presented a memorandum to the President — with which Stettinius had refused to associate himself — urging that the Pacific Islands were of primary importance to the security of the world and that therefore "we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership as a trust on behalf of world security, not for any national advantage. . . . "14 Notwithstanding the inconsistency of speaking of "ownership as a trust" the clamor of Army and Navy succeeded in preventing the Conference at San Francisco from discussing any concrete areas to be placed under the Trusteeship System.
Traditional isolationist sentiment in the United States closely identified itself with the Army-Navy outlook. Senator Harry F. Byrd demanded that "we should control all the mandated islands and Japanese owned islands that the Army and Navy think we should control" and the Hearst press, in May of 1945, followed up by arguing that
The American military and naval authorities know what islands in the Pacific must be permanent strongholds. , . . American military and naval opinion and judgment should prevail in this matter. . . . No other opinion should even be consulted. .. . It is no part of the business of the United Nations Conference of San Francisco. It is not the business of any nation in the world except the United States of America.15
Clearly, the division of opinion within and outside the government was bound to change the last proposals of the Possible Plan and change them even more toward unilateralism.
7 Hull, op. cit., p. 1304, p. 1596-1597. James V. Forrestal, Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 56
8 Hull, op. cit., p. 1599-1600, 1638-1639.
9 Ibid., p. 1466. Notter, op. cit., p. 387. Forrestal, op. dt., p. 33. Also see George H. Blakeslee, "Japan's Mandated Islands," Department of State, Bulletin, December 17, 1944, p. 764, in which the strategic value of the islands is expounded. Huntington Gilchrist, in Foreign Affairs, 1943-1944, demanding an American trusteeship over the Islands for security reasons.
10 Notter, op. cit., p. 481-482.
12 Notter, op. cit., p. 245, p. 606.
13 Forrestal, op. cit., p. 8. Hull, op. cit., p. 1706-1707.
IV The Victory of Strategic Motivations in the United States
Accordingly, the instructions the American delegation carried with it to Yalta Were studiously vague on the topic of trusteeship. Trusteeship principles were to apply to the administration of all colonies but only such areas as were voluntarily submitted by colonial powers should be placed under direct international supervision. The Sponsoring Powers were to draft trusteeship proposals, but "these proposals should deal only with the principles and the mechanism which should govern these trusteeship arrangements. They should not be concerned at this stage with specific territories to be placed under trusteeship or with the disposition or allocation of particular territories." Thus the door was left open for the later realization of Stimson's and Forrestal's demands." Since the two Secretaries continued to insist on a clear American statement of the need to acquire outright control over the Pacific Islands prior to UNCIO, no draft trusteeship proposals could be submitted until a few days after the opening of the Conference. The United States Working Paper which contained these proposals is the expression of the compromise between these clashing domestic motivations."
The Working Paper sought to realize a portion of the liberal humanitarian motives establishing general rules of administration for all colonies, i.e., the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. It sought to apply these demands to specific trust areas to be placed under the Trusteeship Council's supervision though only self-government was to be the ultimate destiny of such territories. Submission of colonies to the System would be voluntary, the United States delegate emphasized, but since it was taken for granted that enemy colonies and dependencies would be so disposed of the Rooseveltian motive of using the System as a means for internationalizing any vital area could be met. Hull's free trade philosophy was to be met through the establishment of the open door in trusts. But while Roosevelt's strategic thinking welcomed the trusteeship device as making control easier, the Armed Services opposition to this approach carried the day at UNCIO. Not only were no specific colonies to be placed under the System discussed at San Francisco, but the introduction of the "strategic trust" idea went a long way toward making internationalization meaningless for the veto-bound Security Council was to exercise supervision over strategic trust areas. Thus appeased, the Army and Navy approved the Working Paper. In the effort to accommodate all motivations, the simple trusteeship proposal of 1942, dictated by liberal humanitarianism and applicable equally to all colonies, was weakened by providing three types of colonial status: strategic trusts with conditional responsibility to the United Nations, ordinary trusts with full United Nations rights of supervision, and the remaining colonial territories over which the United Nations would exercise no jurisdiction directly, though protected by a general declaration of administrative principles. In fact, it was the strategic motivation which was stressed by the first statement of the United States delegate, in which it was declared that international peace and security and the welfare of dependent peoples constituted twin objectives which could not be separated. This seemed to justify the special provision made for strategic trust areas and the per mission to use general trusts for military purposes. In fact, the United States delegation insisted that the first basic objective of the Trusteeship System was "to further international peace and security." Emphasis was now placed on security and not on freedom for colonial peoples. Only on the non-controversial issues of respect for human rights and freedom from discrimination did the Americans welcome the amendment of the Working Paper. The new approach was symbolized best, perhaps, in the joint Anglo-American declaration appended to the Rapporteur's Report of Chapter XII, dealing with the problem of an administering state's withdrawal from the organization or committing an act of aggression. The two delegations declared "that the action to be taken in such a case can only be decided upon at the time and in the light of all relevant circumstances" and they saw no reason why a state's withdrawal from the United Nations should in .any way affect its role as a trustee so long as it continued to fulfill its Charter obligations otherwise.18
Thus established the Trusteeship System seemed innocuous enough to satisfy the sentiments of the most hardened isolationist. When the Senate took up the ratification of the Charter, its Foreign Relations Committee received letters from Stimson and Forrestal explaining that the document met all United States military and strategic needs. Forrestal insisted, however, that the Navy be consulted before the Pacific Islands be placed under the System and he wanted it understood that
our agreement that this Charter is in accord with the military interests of this country is conditioned by our understanding that the United States is not committed by this Charter or any provision thereof to place under trusteeship any territories of any character, and that if this country hereafter determines to place any territory under trusteeship this will be done only on such terms as it may then voluntarily agree to.19
When questioned on the same point by Senator Johnson of California, the Chairman, Senator Connally, confirmed that "under our conception, all we have to do is to hold on to them [the Pacific Islands] until such time as we need to give them up. I do not think that we would want to give them up if they are in strategic areas. If we did we would give them up with strings on them . . . ". Mr. Pasvolsky then confirmed this interpretation.20 The final American formula succeeded in satisfying both the strategic and the humanitarian motivation, though it was the latter which had to pay the greater price.
13 Forrestal, op. cit., p. 36.
14 Ibid., p. 28, p. 37-38.
15 National Conference of Christians and Jews, Uncio Memos, No. 2, May 9, 1945.
16 Notter, op. cit., p. 387-390, 662-663.
17 Ibid., p. 428-434, Forrestal, op. cit., p. 44-45.
18 The voluntary nature of the System was clearly expressed by Leo Pasvolsky in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See The Charter of the United Nations,
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senates, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1945) p.316. The United States stand is described in United Nation Conference in International Organization. Documents, vol. X (London and New York 1945), hereafter cited as UNCIO. See especially Documents 310, p. 439-440; 552, p. 477-478; 877, p. 513-514; 1018, p. 543-544; and Annex C. of Document 1091, p. 620.
19 Hearings, op. cit., Letter to the Committee, July 9, 1945, p. 313-314.
V Acceptance and the Challenge to Empire
It was the United States which took the initiative in advocating an expanded principle of trusteeship after the war but the aspirations of the dependent areas provided the chorus which produced the underlying demand for such a system. The State Department was made particularly conscious of the need to meet the ever-growing force of colonial national ism by the situation in the former Dutch East Indies. As the reconquest of this area was undertaken, the United States government refrained from making an agreement with the Netherlands government in order not to prejudice the future independence of Indonesia.21 But similar demands were heard elsewhere. The Congress Party in India, on the threshold of independence, was clamoring for the elimination of colonialism everywhere through international action. The Philippine government and the Chinese government agreed. Egypt, Iraq, Syria and many Latin Ameri can states, especially Mexico, went on record in their desire for an international supervisory system which would guide all dependent areas to independence. The very nations which had until recently been ruled from Europe and Washington were the chief advocates of a firm anti colonial policy to be adopted by the new United Nations Organization.
It was not surprising therefore that the chief criticism of the American Working Paper at San Francisco came from this camp. National independence, then, was the watchword for the Asian and Arab delegations. Australia and New Zealand were quick to identify themselves with this group, though their motivations were by no means entirely due to humanitarian considerations. While Evatt demanded the obligatory submission of all colonies to United Nations supervision and pressed for a far more detailed statement of administrative principles by which colonial powers were to guide themselves than provided in the American draft, a persistent emphasis on strategic factors emerged as well. Thus the Australians were quite as consistent as the American delegation in urging the primacy of security considerations and the need to free “C” Mandates from restrictions as to fortification. Nor did Evatt or New Zealand's Peter Frazer challenge the strategic trust proposal. It appears that this Dominion attitude was dictated, first, by the desire to appease the clamor of the nationalist movements to the north in order to live in harmony with these emergent national communities, and secondly by the desire to consolidate control over strategic outposts under the guise of disinterested trusteeships. Nevertheless, the effect of these motivations was a union of forces between the young nations at UNCIO and the Dominion demands in challenging the American compromise.22
The Arab and Asian states themselves differed in their substantive proposals despite their united opposition to the Working Paper. China demanded "self-government or independence" as the aim for trust areas and the creation of legislative assemblies in them. The immunity of strategic trusts from United Nations supervision was to be minimized, trust ad ministration was to be in United Nations hands and infractions of trustee ship obligations were to be considered matters of international concern. While China's motivations did not seem to include immediate colonial emancipation the Chinese delegate nevertheless was quoted as saying that
For the United States to annex or lay permanent claim to single trusteeships of Pacific Islands would be unfortunate indeed. This would constitute a dangerous precedent for England and Russia to do like wise with territories they have torn from the enemy... . Single-nation controls are dangerous — dependent peoples must be assured of economic assistance and eventual independence. . . ."
Similar restraint was not displayed by Egypt, the Philippines, Syria, Mexico and Iraq. Preparation of all colonies for independence by the United Nations was demanded in emphatic terms, and the Philippines' Carlos Romulo insisted that "self-government" really meant independence. Mexico stressed the primacy of native welfare over security and called attention to what was considered the parallel situation of 1919. Egypt wanted trusts assigned, transferred and terminated by action of the General Assembly and mandates included in the System by definition rather than by voluntary submission. Strategic trusts were to be minimized and the administering state was not to possess unlimited rights to make use of trusts for security purposes. Rights of existing mandatory states were to be weakened and the privileges of indigenous populations enhanced in what seemed an Egyptian attempt to use the Trusteeship System to change British policy in Palestine and Jordan. The demand that native populations were to be consulted in the choice of the trustee, like the other claims, was rejected by the colonial powers who countered that the "voluntary basis" of the system would be destroyed by these amendments to the Working Paper."
These aspirations, to be sure, were not met in anything like their entirety. But the mere assertion of colonial nationalist demands made the creation of some new trusteeship arrangement a foregone conclusion. Unlike the situation in 1919, international accountability on basic human rights, on freedom from discrimination and economic exploitation and even a limited amount of political development was not seriously challenged at all in 1945. While the total motivation of the former colonial areas was not realized at UNCIO the acceptance of the expanded Trusteeship System itself constituted a recognition of the demands of the new nationalism.
VI Acceptance and Soviet Motivations
Moreover, the forces working toward the acceptance of the trusteeship principle derived a good deal of support from sources outside former colonial areas. Not only was much private and public sentiment in the United States in favor of a New Deal but similar pressure was exerted by the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent by Labor opinion in the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union raised the issue of trusteeship as early as the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and pressed the United States for a definite commitment. Molotov had expressed an interest in it at the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 1943, while Eden was not prepared to discuss it then. At Yalta the Soviet spokesmen took no exception to the United States proposals but they brought their own scheme to San Francisco, a scheme which departed in some essential respects from the United States plan. Thus while the Soviet plan accepted the distinction between trust areas and the general declaration for other colonial territories, the Russians specified that full national independence was to be the aim for trusts and that United Nations supervision was to ensure progress toward full independence. The Trusteeship Council was to possess full powers of direct inspection and investigation in trust areas, a point on which the United States plan had been less definite. And finally, the Soviet Union demanded a permanent seat for itself on the Council. These points were insisted upon by the Soviet delegation at UNCIO and they also demanded that colonial powers assume responsibility for developing all dependent people toward political progress, though independence was not directly called for. Naturally enough, the Soviets insisted that the term "states directly concerned" be defined in detail, since the Soviet Union later claimed to be one of those states.25 Furthermore, it appears that Soviet readiness to accede to the strategic . aspects of the United States plan was motivated by the desire of acquiring a similar trust for the Soviet Union, expressed by Molotov to Stettinius at UNCIO. This desire took on concrete form at the Potsdam Conference, at which Stalin made it plain that the Soviet Union was interested in obtaining a trusteeship over Libya, thus meeting the United States Navy's strategic claims in the Pacific with corresponding claims in the Mediterranean;26 Whatever Soviet motivations in 1945 may have been, it is clear that Soviet support for the adoption of a trusteeship principle was a powerful force making for the acceptance of the System by the colonial powers.
20 Ibid., p. 314-316.
21 Hull, op. cit., p. 1599.
22 UNCIO, op. cit., Documents 230, p. 641-655; 241, p. 428-429; 1018, p. 543. Herbert V. Evatt, Australia in World Affairs (Sydney, 1946), p. 28-30, 50, 111-112, 133, 166, 184. Also see Evatt's contribution to K. M. Panikkar (ed.), Regionalism. and Security (New Delhi, 1948). 23 National Conference of Christians and Jews, Uncio Memos, No. 3, May 16, 1945.
24 UNCIO, op. cit., Documents 364, p. 446- 447; 404, p. 452-454; 448, p. 459-460; 512, p. 468-470; 552, p. 475-478; 580, p. 485-488; 712, p. 496-500; 735, p. 506-507; 877, p. 513-518; 1018, p. 543-544.
VII Acceptance and the Position of British Labor
Nor was the position of the British Labor Party a factor to be ignored. Participating in the wartime coalition government and readying itself for the general election of 1945, the party was in an excellent position to force some of its policies on the Conservatives. Thus the party's colonial platform in 1943 had called for the development of political self-government "and the attainment of political rights not less than those enjoyed or claimed by those of British democracy." It also demanded "the application of Socialist policy in the economic organization of the colonies and the acceptance of the principle of international supervision and accountability." In 1944, the Annual Conference of the party declared:
In all colonial territories the first aims of the administration must be the well-being and education of the native inhabitants; their standards of life and health; and their preparation for self-government without delay... . There must be a sincere determination on the part of those responsible for colonial administration to put native interests first in the priorities they organize. .. . In regions such as Africa, South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific, where neighboring colonies are administered by different Governments, we strongly recommend the early creation of Regional Councils to coordinate economic policy — trade, transport, etc. — with a view to making the interests of the colonial peoples primary beyond all doubt.
Not only was the administering authority to publish regular and full reports on its work, but the regional councils to be created were to be given facilities for direct inspection in all colonies. It was the party's left wing, however, which tended to make the anti-imperialism issue one of the mainstays of the program, while the party leadership had no such overriding interest in it.27 To a much greater degree than is true of the anti-imperialist pressure exerted by the Australian and New Zealand Labor Parties, this program must be attributed to the liberal humanitarian motivation. To the British workingman the development of a strong Indonesian or Indian nationalism was not a matter of direct concern, to be appeased in time. British Labor's colonial program in 1945, while by no means as rigidly socialist as in 1918, nevertheless espoused international accountability as a progressive principle rather than as a diplomatic con cession, in contrast to Conservative coolness toward the whole approach. But it must be admitted that Labor's program could easily consider itself satisfied with the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories | and did not have to hold out for the more extreme liberal demands.
25 Notter, op. cit., p. 660-661. Hull, op. cit., p. 1304-1305. UNCIO, op. cit., Documents 241, p. 428; 310, p. 441; 404, p. 453; 230, p. 641-655.
26 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 76-77, 92-96. E. Zhukov, writing in New Times, No. 14, 1945, claims that Soviet policy was motivated by the desire immediately to end colonial imperialism and to acquire a strategic trust area.
X Acceptance and the Opposition to Trusteeship
Despite American proposals, Soviet pressure, Arab assertions and Socialist declarations the governments of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa yielded only slowly and exacted a large toll from the original demands for a colonial New Deal. During the last two years of the war, while preparations for the System were being made, the government of General Charles de Gaulle gave no evidence of any interest in these developments. In fact, the Free French Government's record seems to suggest that a tightening of the French Empire through the French Union was contemplated rather than an increase of international supervisory jurisdiction. After having been invited to become one of the sponsoring governments, the French delegation at San Francisco generally associated itself with the United States Working Paper, but proposed a number of changes. Thus, instead of mentioning self-government or independence among the goals of the Trusteeship System, the French plan merely called for the "progressive development of political institutions." The System, moreover, was to be limited to mandates and enemy colonies and the necessity for securing the submission of such areas with the consent of the mandatories was stressed. And finally, the French plan made no mention of the power of the Trusteeship Council to investigate conditions or receive petitions. During the discussions in the Committee the French expressed the hope that the debate would proceed within "precise limits" and called attention to the fact that the Dumbarton Oaks Draft expressly forbade intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. Again taking refuge behind the non-intervention doc trine, the French delegation declared in an annex to the Rapporteur's Report that "none of the provisions submitted for the approval of this Committee implies total or partial renunciation by the French Government" of this principle. French lack of enthusiasm for the System was thus not left in doubt, and French acceptance, as in 1919, must be attributed to considerable outside pressure.28
The French were not alone in their opposition. South Africa declared herself unable to accept any changes in the existing mandate terms and opposed the extension of the trusteeship principle to territories within the metropolitan area of member states, i.e. to South-West Africa after the Union was ready to annex it.29 The trusteeship principle, urged the Netherlands delegation, was an admirable device for dealing with enemy areas, but it would hinder rather than help the development toward self-government if applied to colonies, since the European possessions would naturally progress toward free association with the metropolitan area. Specifically, it was pointed out that in areas in which the prerequisites for independence existed such a status would be achieved with or without the activities of the United Nations. Instead the Dutch wanted the international system to assure protection of native land rights, abolish forced labor and end racial discrimination. They were distinctly not interested in the political features of the United States Working Paper.30 Dutch acquiescence in the System can thus be explained primarily as resulting from the non-application of its operative features to the Dutch possessions.
It was the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom, however, which was of focal importance not primarily at San Francisco but during the preceding two years when the United States developed its trusteeship proposals. At first, the Foreign Office seemed to follow a policy of studied indifference. Cordell Hull relates that he mentioned the American trusteeship scheme of 1943 no less than three times to Anthony Eden at Quebec before the Foreign Secretary decided to acknowledge it. And continues Hull, "the Foreign Secretary said that, to be perfectly frank, he had to say he did not like our draft very much. He said it was the word] 'independence' that troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire System, which was built on the basis of Dominion and colonial status."31 Eden again refused to consider the trusteeship problem at the Moscow Conference and no particular interest in the matter was expressed by the British delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Just before Yalta, Colonel Oliver Stanley, Colonial Secretary, suggested to Washington that the other colonial powers be consulted before further talks were conducted, but the State Department refused to comply because it was feared that the British merely wanted to bolster the anti-trusteeship camp through this procedure. At this stage, the British suggested international supervision through Regional Commissions composed only of colonial powers, and again the State Department turned this suggestion down as inadequate." Obviously, no progress toward a strong Trusteeship System could be made without the cooperation of the principal colonial power, and this British attitude was sufficient in itself to induce the United States to weaken its original sweeping proposals, even without the further impetus of domestic American opposition to trusteeship.
At San Francisco, the British delegation presented a mixture of con servative humanitarian, economic and strategic motivations in the effort to minimize international control. The British draft trusteeship scheme stipulated self-government as the aim of the System and provided for the submission of any territory to it through the voluntary action of the metropolitan country. Mandates and ex-enemy colonies were to be put under it as well, again through voluntary submission only. Moreover, the administering powers were to be "advanced nations . . . who are best fitted to undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it." In their strategic and military portions the British proposals were identical with the American, but unlike them, the Trusteeship Council was to function under the Economic and Social Council and not as a "principal organ" of the United Nations, apparently an attempt to deprive the Council of importance and publicity. And finally, the British draft made no mention of the Council's right to visit trust areas or to receive petitions.
Existing mandatory rights, the British insisted, could be changed only with the consent of the Mandatory state. Like the French and Dutch, they warned against the introduction of independence by fiat and advised to await its arrival through "natural development.'"8 In the final analysis, therefore, the British conceded only the very qualified "independence" phrase for trusts and the Trusteeship Council's right to visit trusts and receive petitions. This, to be sure, they would scarcely have admitted had it not been for American and Arab pressure. But, as was implied in statements later made in the House of Commons, it was considered wise to sacrifice the facade of control and retain the essence.
Prime Minister Attlee, in presenting the Charter to the House, discussed the Trusteeship System as no more than the main principle of colonial administration which the United Kingdom had followed for decades. Like the State Department, he stressed the role of trust territories in the maintenance of international peace and security and like Senator Connally he assured the House that the Charter did not ipso facto place any territories under international supervision "or take any decision as to future of such territories, nor by passing this motion will the House be entering into any commitment." A Labor member thereupon asked the government to place voluntarily some of the mandates under the System as a gesture of British faith in the new arrangements. Colonel Stanley, now speaking for the opposition, did not view matters in the same light. He demanded assurances of the government that it did not intend to relinquish control over any mandates then held and furthermore that the Government refrain from placing any other British possessions under the System. He advised caution "until it [the government] had had much more experience of the working of the present system, and until we could see much more clearly that it would be to our advantage and the advantage of the Colonial Empire." Mr. Bevin, in answering, was able to reassure the opposition on both counts and there the matter ended.34 Labor's motivations and those of the Conservatives seemed quite reconciled by the Trusteeship System as adopted. Britain's acceptance, therefore, can be attributed first to the need of meeting the demands of her American, Soviet and Dominion allies, and secondly to the fact that acceptance would cost nothing in terms of effective control and perhaps gain something in terms of Arab and Indian good will. Certainly, a policy of unmitigated opposition, such as that adopted by France and The Netherlands, was impossible to a Britain committed to freeing India, Burma and Ceylon and cooperating with Australia and New Zealand. Conflicting inter-Empire and inter-Commonwealth motivations, though far less pronounced in 1945 than in 1919, still prevented the government in London from following the French course.
27 Labor Party, Report of the 43rd Annual Conference, 1944, p. 9, and Report of the 42nd Annual Conference, 1943, p. 4, p. 207-208.
28 UNCIO, op. cit., Document 230, p. 641-655; 260, p. 433; and Annex D to Document 1115, p. 622.
29 Ibid., Document 260, p. 434; 310, p. 439.
30 Ibid., Document 260, p. 433-434; 1090, p. 561-582.
31 Hull, op. cit., p. 1237-1238.
32 Notter, op. cit., p. 662-663.
33 UNCIO, op. cit.,' Document 310, p. 440; 230, p. 641-655.
34 Hansard, vol. 413, August 23, 1945, col. 667-669, 703-704, 929-935, 940.
IX Summation of Reasons for Acceptance
It thus appears that neither a progressive spirit of disinterestedness nor a strong humanitarianism can claim sole credit for the acceptance of the Trusteeship System in 1945. Furthermore, the situation of 1945 offers no evidence that the System was readily accepted because it was to serve as a device to cushion rivalries between imperial powers. Roosevelt, it is true, did consider this aspect. But the fact that the System was applied voluntarily by powers not divided by such rivalries in recent decades should disprove this explanation.
International trusteeship in 1919 owed its acceptance to the necessity of finding a compromise solution to a series of clashing colonial policy motivations. It owed its continuation in 1945 to precisely the same kind of situation. However, the motivations had changed not only in content but, more significantly, in terms of the groups now identified with them. The area of disagreement had tended to shift from the domestic and inter Commonwealth levels to the interallied plane. The protagonists of a colonial New Deal were identified with the new Asian and Arab states and with Latin America, receiving only sporadic support from groups in the United States, while the established colonial powers showed a consistent unity in their opposition to a new colonial policy to be conducted under the auspices of an international organization.
The aspirations of the anti-colonial groups, then, called first and fore most for the realization of the liberal ideology, the elimination of foreign rule and the speedy progress of colonial peoples — all colonial peoples — toward a measure of independent status. Social, cultural and economic progress were not enough. National independence was demanded at the earliest possible moment, to be achieved through the supervision of the United Nations. In the forefront of those who argued in these terms were, of course, the Arab, Asian and Latin American spokesmen. Liberal opinion in the United States at first favored and supported these demands but at least on the governmental level this support slackened by 1945 under the influence of a different type of motivation. And liberal opinion in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, while in theory sympathetic to these aspirations, was a poor third in the actual support given to this motivation. A further motive favorable to the colonial New Deal was that represented by the groups and individuals who welcomed international rule as a device for acquiring strategic bases without seeming to resort to renewed imperial expansion. As in 1919, the members of this group saw no inconsistency between paramount regard for native advancement and the utilization of the areas in question for unilateral military purposes. President Roosevelt and the Department of State as well as the governments of Australia and New Zealand were the typical exponents of this aspiration. The primary motive of the Soviet government in arguing for a strong United Nations Trusteeship System seems to have been the same. A final body of opinion of some moment which supported the colonial New Deal was a group of free traders, symbolized by Cordell Hull, who saw in trusteeship over all colonies a way to combat protectionism. Support for this aspiration was in the main limited to opinion in the United States.
The opposition to the New Deal for colonies, however, was equally strong and was furthermore favored by the fact that it had existing international law and actual control over dependent areas on its side. In the realm of ideology, the conservative humanitarian position was its point of departure. International supervision, said the spokesmen for the British, French and Netherlands governments, was unnecessary if not harmful for the gradual development of colonies toward self-government and free association with the metropolitan country. Similarly, the colonial powers were agreed that the Open Door should be minimized and national prerogatives in investment and trade policies continued. And on the key issue of international or unrestrained unilateral control over strategic bases the spokesmen of the colonial powers agreed with the position of the United States armed services in urging the minimization of supervision. Aspirations, in short, were such as to make the introduction of international controls feared and opposed.
In the dialectic of E. H. Carr, the process of policy formulation in inter national relations is held to be a synthesis of two antithetical forces: the demands of power politics, usually identified with conservatism, and the demands of Utopian idealism, as put forward by liberals and socialists.35 If we apply these concepts to the evolution and acceptance of the trusteeship principle in 1919 and 1945 we may identify the "realist" thesis with those who opposed trusteeship on grounds of national power or those who favored it because it facilitated power compromises. Power in either case is the key criterion of conduct. The "utopian" antithesis, by contrast, would then be represented by those who urged the adoption of trusteeship on grounds of humanitarianism, economic liberalism and devotion to principles of national self-determination. The foregoing analysis should provide ample material for the rejection of this type of categorization motives.
Thus in the realm of the humanitarian ideology, the "realist" no less than the "utopian" can claim his share in the acceptance of the new principle. Regard for the economic, social, cultural and even political development of dependent peoples has long ceased to be the monopoly of the socialist and liberal strands of opinion whom Carr considers to be the Utopians. While it remains true that in 1919 and 1945 conservatives tended to oppose international supervision while liberals generally argued for it, the difference in outlook is to be explained in terms of varying conceptions of "reality". Similarly, the issue of strategic bases cannot be treated simply by claiming that realists sought to prevent international supervision or limit it to insignificant areas because they desired unilateral military control while Utopians were indifferent to this power political aspect of colonies. Again the issue between the proponents and the foes of international supervision involved different interpretation of reality rather than the antithesis suggested by Carr. Nor can the economic factor in colonialism be easily fitted into the scheme. To be sure, protectionism and opposition to trusteeship tended to go hand in hand while the prin ciple of the Open Door was generally identified with those who argued for international supervision. But while the interplay between the two forces was a vital factor in facilitating the acceptance of the principle only a value judgment would entitle us to brand the Open Door as "utopian", even in the Mannheimian sense.
35 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London, 1948).
X Implications for the Future
The fact that the United Nations Charter was able to synthesize these clashing aims should not obscure the equally important fact that the "synthesis" was somewhat artificial. To be sure, liberal humanitarianism received its satisfaction in the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories but conservative humanitarianism was made content by the limited application of the Trusteeship System proper. Military opponents of international rule were reconciled through the strategic trust provisions but those who saw in trusteeship a means for internationalizing future troubles pots received satisfaction through the possibility of the submission of any colonial area to the System. Economic liberals could take comfort in the Open Door provision and economic protectionists in the corresponding escape clauses. Colonial nationalism was temporarily appeased but colonial empires seemed also to remain intact. How a "reconciliation" of this type would work in practice was soon demonstrated by the stormy sessions of the Trusteeship Council and especially by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, in which the colonial powers consistently oppose the unceasing demands of India and the Moslem states for speedier progress toward colonial independence.
Clearly, no single motivation was satisfied with the compromise at UNCIO. And the developmental potentialities of the Trusteeship System are in sore danger of suffering atrophy because of the superficial nature of the compromise. Only the fact that clashes in colonial policy have today shifted from the domestic and inter-Commonwealth levels to the inter Allied plane may provide us with hope that international supervision will continue as a force of some moment. In a very real sense, the success of the Trusteeship System is intimately tied up with the ability of western statesmanship to adopt the long-range view of concession to the Arab Asian demands instead of the short-range policy, notably represented by France at the moment, to "hold on" at all cost and defy the United Nations in the process, if necessary.
Keeping the Arab and Asian states favorably disposed toward the West has emerged as one of the chief tasks of NATO diplomacy. Obviously this requires a modicum of concession to their aspirations which happen to include the desire to make use of the Trusteeship System for the elimination of colonialism. Long-range benefits for the West, it would seem, could be obtained by giving the Arab-Asian bloc the satisfaction of seeing further withdrawals from colonial possessions. And the forum of the United Nations could provide the mechanism whereby this interest would be served at a minimum of expense in terms of prestige lost by the old colonial powers. Instead of the short-range course of meeting Indian or Egyptian complaints with compromise resolution after compromise resolution, the implementation of which is always open to considerable doubt, the colonial powers might regard the United Nations as a useful agency for giving the champions of anti-colonialism — defeated in 1945 — an opportunity to express their preferences and for giving them the further satisfaction of seeing their demands carried out.
The South-West and North African situations as well as the unwillingness shown by the administering authorities of regular trusts to expedite their own withdrawal, however, seem to confirm the victory of the short range view. If this trend is to continue the surface synthesis achieved at San Francisco will become increasingly artificial and not even the Cold War will act as a catalyst toward the progress of international supervision.
