前から読みたかったトンガ王国の文献
以下メモ
＜１章＞
SIDSの文献は限られているが、2000年頃から徐々に増えてきている。
e. Literature Review
The literature on SIDs has gradually increased over the past 20 years, focusing specifically on issues of climate change, sustainable development, security, renewable energy, economic and trade limitations (Commonwealth: 2014; Commonwealth: 2017). Many of these studies have been largely published by the Commonwealth Secretariat and focus on proposing new methods and solutions to ensure the survival of SIDS.
Additionally, literature on regional, Pacific diplomacy and other aspects of society, culture, tradition, and history of the South Pacific Islands has increased, as more and more Pacific Islanders have graduated in the academic field of Social Sciences. Nonetheless, specific literature focusing primarily on the diplomatic practice of Pacific Islands including Tonga is scarce.
日本より早く、トンガは憲法を制定している。しかしの起源はさらに遡って1839年。Vava’u Code
1 The first attempt to establish a set of codified laws was the Vava’u Code of 1839. Provisions of the Code focused on improving primarily the lifestyle of Tongan society, emphasising the importance of fidelity and observance of the sacredness of the Sabbath, and introducing the provision to limit the once endless power of chiefs over their people. In 1850, the Vava’u Code was further amended to incorporate the ‘new and powerful position of the Hau’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.27) and emphasised that ‘the King was the root of all government and that it was his prerogative to appoint those who should govern’ (Ibid)
2 The Constitution contains a total of 115 provisions governing (i) Declaration of Rights; (ii) Form of Government; (iii) The Land. For more information see: Act of Constitution (1988) .
3 The name was bestowed by Captain James Cook during his visit to Tonga in 1777, after he had witnessed the ‘Inasi Ceremony’ during one of his voyages to Tonga. During the ‘Inasi Ceremony, it was compulsory for commoners to pay tribute in the form of presentation of fruits/harvest to their local chiefs especially, during the harvest months of July/October (Latukefu, 1975,p.8)
＜２章＞ 引き続き２章からメモ」
“I verily wish to be the friend of Britain; in friendly alliance, with all fellowship, but it is not my mind, nor the mind of my people, that we should be subject to any other people or kingdom in the world. But it is our mind to sit down (that is, remain) an independent nation.”~ King George Tupou I, 1850 (Joris de Boris, 1974).
下線引きました。重要
At the end of the 1900s, much of the Pacific Region had befallen either annexation or colonisation. Tonga remained the exception to this, for despite, formally becoming a British Protected State in 1900; Tonga still maintained complete independence and sovereignty.
This chapter will seek to examine: (i) the origins of the Treaty; (ii) determine whether Tonga was a Protectorate or British protected State; (iii) evaluate the effects of the Treaty and (iv) determine the factors that led to the end of the Treaty. However, before proceeding any further, a brief discussion on the use of Treaty making in the South Pacific during the 19th century proves necessary.
条約がトンガ国内政治に利用された、
Though I do agree with the aforementioned interpretations, I believe it tends to imply that Treaties were merely employed as a means to an end. I do not perceive this as the true essence of Treaties. On the contrary, Treaties should also be considered as playing an integral role in the formative years of developing a nation’s internal governance particularly, in the case of Tonga.
日本と同じく統一国家であったことが植民地化を逃れた理由
The exception to this trend was Tonga, for they had achieved the transition from chieftainship rule to a unified Kingdom ruled by Constitutional Monarch, King George Tupou I, whose goal was to emulate and adopt the practices of the British Monarch system to Tonga. With this in mind, one is drawn to believe that as a civilised nation, Tonga should have had more of an equal standing and balance of relations with European powers via the use of Treaties
1855年トンガと最初に条約を締結したのはフランスで宗教的な内容だった。これにツポウ一世は危機感を
The first nation to have signed a Treaty of Friendship with Tonga was France in 1855. The reality of the Treaty was that it was largely based on political-religious interests’ rather than mutual interests (Latukefu, 1974: Grijp, 2014). In the years that followed, the decision to pursue the Treaty only further led to the growing disparity between the Roman Catholics and the Tongan Monarch.8 This became of great concern to Tupou I, as it impressed upon him that much work was still required to be done, to...
ヨーロッパ法を基準とした独自の憲法を制定した。
upou I moved to establish a more codified and constitutional code of law that proved more in favour with the European legal system which was ultimately, culminated and established as the Act of Constitution 187511. The 132 Article Constitution was passed by Parliament in 1875, as the Supreme Law of the Land and focuses on 3 main principles (1) Declaration of Rights; (2) Form of Government and (3) The Land.
憲法制定と共にトンガの独立を最初に認めたのがドイツ。ドイツは商業的利益と軍事基地設置の許可を得た。
The first nation to formally recognise Tonga as an independent nation following the establishment of the 1875 Constitution was the German Empire in 1876.
(1) trade opportunities: many German traders immigrating to Tonga were interested in the rising Copra Production Enterprise. Additionally, the allowances for the leasing of land to Europeans now permitted by the 1875 Code was another key factor and resulted in an influx of traders looking to setup plantations and establish trading stations on the island;
(2) maritime security: when the treaty was later ratified in 1877, Germany obtained trading rights and approval for establishment of a naval station on Tonga’s outer northern island of Vava’u (Latukefu, 1975, p.56).
あまり語られないが島国が大国との条約を希望するケースは結構ある。ツポウ1世も同じく。
Despite this, Tupou I was still keen on gaining the recognition and approval of the British Empire. Previous attempts to establish foreign relations with the British Empire were led by Tupou I including a written request to establish a treaty between the two States; however, his requests fell on deaf ears (New Zealand Herald, 1879)
結果ツポウ一世の動きが英国を利する条約締結となった。
Ironically, German interests in Tonga urged the British to show a sudden interest in Tonga and thus, led to the signing of the ‘Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Tonga’ in 1879 later ratified in 1881. The treaty guaranteed similar trading rights as to the Germans however, with the added twist that the British were named ‘the most favoured nation’ in Tongan foreign relations (Treaty of Friendship, 1880, Article II).
当初トンガにあまり関心がなかった英国が意を決したのは、トンガに近いフィジーの権益を守るためであり、そのために1899年のサモア条約でサモアをドイツに譲ったのだ。。
The decision to forfeit treaty rights in Samoa in exchange for Tonga was a difficult but necessary choice at the time and was predominantly, a strategic one based on the location of Tonga.
The risk of losing Tonga to a foreign power was too great for it would jeopardise the social and economic British interests in Fiji, given Tonga’s relatively close location to Fiji. Furthermore, the additional risks of the Vava’u Harbour ‘Port au Refuge’ becoming a central pacific naval base to any hostile powers was too great to ignore.
この動乱の時期を差配したつぽう1世は97歳でご逝去。子息も孫も先に亡くなっていた。
In 1893, Tonga said farewell to their visionary leader, King George Tupou I having passed away at the age of 97 with a reign of over 70 years19. In line with Article 32 of the Constitution, Taufa’ahau the King’s great-grandson ascended to the throne at the young age of 19 as King George Tupou II (Eustis, 1997).
保護領という名の植民地をツポウ2世は激しく拒否
Initially, Tupou II contested the proposal of both Articles particularly, with the notion of Tonga becoming a ‘Protectorate.’ To Tupou II, the term ‘Protectorate’ was merely a substitution for ‘colony’, for it would mean that appointed British Consuls would preside and administer over the internal affairs of Tonga. This was unacceptable, as it would jeopardise and threaten Tonga’s independent and sovereign status.
ここら辺の主権を守ろうとする保護領条文に関するやりとりは興味深い。結局どうなったのか？条約がどのように運用されたのか？
To avert the all out domination of the British Empire on Tonga’s independence, Tupou II proposed the following amendments to the treaty:
i. Tonga would remain an independent and sovereign State able to govern and conduct their own internal affairs despite, agreeing to become a British Protected State;
ii. The advice and appointment of a British Consul was welcomed however, he ‘was not to interfere with internal matters in which foreigners were not concerned’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.70);
iii. The British Consul shall have jurisdiction over all foreigners charged with civil and criminal crimes however; they were to be tried in a Tongan court accordingly;
英国との保護条約の誤解は両国に深刻な軋轢を生んだが、結果的に良い結果ももたらした。国際法の制定と運用の興味深い例だろう。それにしてもツポウ２世は偉い！
Concurrently, intervention can be interpreted to have affected Tonga in a positive way: (i) it proved a wakeup call for Tupou II to pay closer attention to developing the welfare of his people and government. To achieve this he would need to step up and conduct certain internal developments to maintain stability and welfare of his people and thus, avoid further interference from the British; (ii) Campbell’s actions forced the British Government to pay more attention to the illegal actions of their representatives abroad and also, acknowledge the need to limit British intervention in Tonga’s affairs; (iii) brought Tongans closer together, brought the Monarch closer to his people and instilled a newfound sense of nationalism and patriotism within Tongan society which had been dormant for a while.
戦後の世界秩序の中でトンガと英国の条約内容も変更された。
Perhaps, the inclusion of Article II in the revised 1958 Treaty was intentional and was indeed a direct means to ease the raising questions posed by Tungi. At the same time, the Treaty also gave the Tongan Government leeway by stating that the British were to consult the Government prior to engaging in any international agreements in relation to Tonga. The slow release of control and power by the British maybe interpreted as a changing of the tides, perhaps because as Tonga was beginning to show signs of stability, the need for tight control was no longer necessary
しかしトンガ王国は独立を望んでいたのだ。妥協案として1968年に追加された条項
Treaty outlined certain concessions by the British such as (i) the requirement to consult the Tongan Government prior to the signing of any international agreements on behalf of Tonga (Article III); (ii) although Britain would continue to provide security and defence for Tonga however, if required, Tonga shall be allowed to seek assistance elsewhere (Article IV); (iii) approval for the King of Tonga to appoint a Consul or High Commissioner to represent the Government’s interests in the United Kingdom (Article VI); (vi) inclusion of the termination clause which clearly stated that all but Article I (to maintain perpetual peace and cooperation between the two States) of the original Treaty shall remain in force.
２章の最後の議論は興味深いので機械訳貼っておきます。
7. Discussion
At the outset, the British believed that the Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga proved as Tonga’s salvation. As illustrated in the aforementioned passages this was not the case. What began as a formal agreement of perpetual friendship and cooperation actually began as a very turbulent and explosive relationship between the two nations. This was largely due to the clash in personalities and ideals both from the British and Tongan side during the reign of Tupou II.
Given time, the two states learned to co-exist and work with each other instead of working against one another. Despite, Tonga’s relatively small size and lack of resources, they were still able to tackle the hardships the British Government threw at them during the Treaty of Friendship of 1900-1970. Tonga’s greatest weapon was in the form of the Tongan Act of Constitution 1875, which not only gained Tonga international recognition by the great European powers of the 19th century (Germany, France and United States). Although, such recognition may have only been at face value with the main intent for the Great Powers to establish trade routes and harbours in Tonga, the fact of the matter still remains that Tonga did gain international recognition as an Independent and Sovereign state.
Moreover, the civilised state of society which the British found Tonga to be, during the beginning of the Treaty is one that was unheard of, in the Pacific region. One that had an established form of government, an established Constitution to govern their internal affairs and a population of converted Christians. Perhaps, one would think the British would be happy to have engaged in a Treaty with a ‘civilised nation’ however, their imperialist and white supremacy views tended to cloud their judgement and thus, resulted in mounting tensions between the two nations during the reign of Tupou II.
It is important to note that the British often resorted to coercive means throughout the course of the Treaty as a means to achieve their own interests; Tonga did not retaliate in the same manner. On the contrary, retaliation on the part of Tonga was conducted in the form of words and negotiations. In their view, such actions proved just how civilised Tonga was, a lesson which was later learned and appreciated by the British during the reign of Salote and Taufa’ahau.
One can also envision the Treaty years as being a necessary tool in the development of Tonga as a state and nation. In my view, the British protected years allowed the Tongan Government to focus inward and develop the social and economic welfare of Tongan society internally. The efforts of Salote helped to preserve the cultural identity of Tongan people. On the other hand, the preliminary modernisation policies of Taufa’ahau during his term as Prime Minister advanced the infrastructural systems and development of Tonga as a nation.
Despite, this PSIDs fight for independence and sovereignty from external powers influence continues to appear in the 21st century. The latest example is the Republic of Fiji’s conquest to isolate the major powers of the Pacific (New Zealand and Australia) from having a say in Pacific Island politics32. The repeat actions of PSIDs continuous battle for complete independence and the ramifications of such conquests in the form of sanctions and bans by middle and bigger powers illustrate the dynamic and unbalance nature of diplomacy. In order, to capitalise on this unbalanced relationship, PSIDs such as Fiji and Tonga need to learn to play the game of diplomacy wisely.
7. 考察
当初、英国は英国とトンガの間の友好条約がトンガの救済策になると信じていた。しかし、前述の文章で示したように、実際にはそうではなかった。永遠の友好と協力の正式な合意として始まったはずの関係は、実際には両国間の非常に波乱に満ちた爆発的な関係として始まった。これは主に、ツポウ2世の治世下における英国とトンガの両側面での性格や理想の衝突によるものであった。
時が経つにつれ、両国は互いに敵対するのではなく、共存し協力し合うことを学んでいきました。トンガは比較的小さな国であり、資源にも乏しいにもかかわらず、1900年から1970年の友好条約の間に英国政府から突きつけられた困難にも立ち向かうことができました。トンガの最大の武器は1875年のトンガ憲法法であり、この憲法法は19世紀のヨーロッパの大国（ドイツ、フランス、米国）からトンガに国際的な認知をもたらしました。しかし、このような認知は、大国がトンガに貿易ルートや港を確立することを主な目的としていたため、表面的なものでしかなかったかもしれません。それでも、トンガが独立主権国家として国際的に認知されたという事実は変わりません。
さらに、条約締結当初、英国がトンガを文明社会とみなしたことは、太平洋地域では前代未聞のことでした。トンガには確立された政府形態があり、内政を司る憲法も制定され、キリスト教に改宗した国民がいました。おそらく、英国人は「文明国」との条約締結を喜んでいるだろうと考える人もいるでしょう。しかし、帝国主義と白人至上主義の考え方が彼らの判断を曇らせ、ツポウ2世の治世下で両国の緊張が高まる結果となりました。
重要なのは、英国が自国の利益を追求するために、条約締結の過程でしばしば強制的な手段に訴えたことです。トンガは同様の報復を行いませんでした。それどころか、トンガ側の報復は言葉や交渉という形で行われました。彼らの考えでは、そのような行動こそがトンガの文明性を証明するものであり、この教訓は後にサロテとタウファアハウの治世下で英国が学び、評価することとなりました。
また、この条約の時代は、国家としてのトンガの発展に必要不可欠な手段であったと考えることもできます。私の考えでは、英国による保護の時代は、トンガ政府が国内に目を向け、トンガ社会の社会福祉と経済福祉を国内で発展させることを可能にしました。サロテの努力は、トンガの人々の文化的アイデンティティの維持に役立ちました。一方、タウファアハウが首相在任中に打ち出した近代化政策の準備段階は、トンガという国家のインフラシステムと発展を促進しました。
しかし、こうした外部勢力からの独立と主権を求める戦いは、21世紀の今日でも続いている。最新の例としては、フィジー共和国が太平洋諸島における政治に発言権を持つ主要国（ニュージーランドとオーストラリア）を孤立させることに成功したことが挙げられる。PSIDによる完全独立を求める戦いの繰り返し、そして、中規模および大規模な大国による制裁や禁止という形で現れるこうした征服の余波は、外交のダイナミックかつアンバランスな本質を明らかにしている。このアンバランスな関係を最大限に活用するためには、フィジーやトンガなどのPSIDは、外交というゲームを賢くプレイする方法を学ぶ必要がある。
＜３章＞
1970年から2010年の期間における独立主権国家としての外交の舞台におけるトンガの実績 は日本びいきのツポウ5世の活躍、悩みを目の前で多少見てきたので、さらに興味深い章である。
島嶼国の独立の背景には1950−60年の植民国の事務所の縮小があった。すなわち島嶼の強い独立運動ではなかったのだ。
As explored by Ward (2005), the foundations for many Pacific Island’s journey to self governance and independence can be traced as far back as the 1950-60s, when Colonial Governments began to withdraw their explicit role in the administration of indigenous Governments.
トンガの国防、外交はある意味ツポウ５世が開始し、担った。
In its early days, MINOFA although headed by the Prime Minister, was under the charge and responsibility of the newly graduated Crown Prince Tupouto’a36. Prior to his newfound role, Tupouto’a had completed the Oxford University Foreign Service Programme in the UK (1969) and military training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK the previous year. On the 20th March 1979, Tupouto’a was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence (MINOFA, 1979).
離島の獲得がUNCLOSを推進するきっかけに、
iii. UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCOLS): following the extension of Tonga’s EEZ with the acquisition of Teleki Tonga/ Teleki Tokelau in 1972, Tonga’s participation in the UNCOLS was of the utmost importance particularly; to ensure Tonga fully capitalised on the bountiful marine life and natural resources within their extended EEZ. Moreover, as a PSIDS with insufficient resources; the need to have a say in the foundations of the Convention was of great significance44 (PMO, 1975);
ここで引用されている佐藤氏は私が主催した研究会の委員に私が読んできた。
For more information on recommendations to improve Tonga’s maritime surveillance please see: Fifita CS (2015) Enhancing Tonga’s maritime security.
ツポウ５世の時代の苦悩
Despite such benefits and societal developments, Tonga continued to face hard times particularly, with: (i) the general population’s rise against the traditional form of governance; (ii) vocalized opinions from expatriate Tongan communities against the Royal Family’s involvement in Government operations and businesses and (iii) the increasing call for a more open, transparent and democratic form of governance by bilateral donor partners and agencies (James, 2000: Campbell, 2011).
UNCLOSへの参加がトンガの国際的地位を確立したとの分析は興味深い。そして王室直轄の国防・外交運営の意味。ツポウ５世への批判は一切書かれていないが、小国の国家運営の限界と課題はそこにある。
ここも長いが引用しておく。
6. Discussion
As a PSIDS lacking in resources and manpower in the 70s, Tonga faced the challenge of tackling responsibility for their foreign relations and defence of her borders head on, with the establishment of the MINOFA and Tonga Defence Services. Perhaps, the positioning of MINOFA under the purview of the PMO was intentional by Taufa’ahau for two primary reasons: (i) the Monarch still maintained a keen interest in the external affairs of the island nation and could intervene easily as the PM was after all his own younger brother; (ii) the assignment of the Department to the young Crown Prince, perhaps, was somewhat of a test by Taufa’ahau for his heir, to give him the ability to develop his own ideas particularly, in relation to Tonga’s foreign and defence relations.
Furthermore, early establishment of bilateral relations with traditional allies New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, illustrates Tonga’s historical links to such nations still ran deep. At the same time, the employment of honorary consuls and consular networks and increased setup of established missions abroad further assisted in diversifying the pursuit of Tonga’s national interests in the global arena.
Equally, Tonga capitalised on increasing bilateral relations with different nations both regionally and internationally. Additionally, Tonga’s presence and involvement in regional organisations solidified Tonga’s cooperation and alliances with her Pacific neighbours. Despite being a remote PSIDS, geographically isolated from the international arena, Tonga still managed to keep abreast of the events occurring in the global arena by participating in regional and international organisations pertaining directly to their economic and social interests of Tonga particularly, UNCOLS. Furthermore, it was much more important for Tonga to retain a presence at the decision making table and having a say rather than merely sitting on the sidelines watching bigger, more powerful nations dominate and make all the decisions.
Additionally, it can be said that during the 70s to 80s, Tonga capitalised on their greatest asset- their people by developing their manpower, technical capabilities and introduction of new roles such as the TDS’s expanding role of maritime security.
As Tonga’s interests began to shift towards more economic interests, so did their company of bilateral relations. In the early 20th century, much of the Western economy was dominated by European superpowers however, following the end of the Cold War (80s), the rising dominance and power of the Asia-Pacific Rim became evident. 1998 saw the loss of one of Tonga’s oldest bilateral partners (Taiwan) in exchange for a great Asia super power PRC. 1999 also, marked Tonga’s shift from being a mere UNobserver to a fully fledged member of the United Nations with the setup of a permanent representation mission in New York and Tonga’s first resident mission to Washington, DC.
As Tonga entered the new millennium (2000), the foreign ministry itself underwent certain significant changes in terms of responsibility and although, still acts as the main channel of communication to foreign missions and foreign states has faced certain challenges which have only been further amplified with the Constitutional and Political reform of 2010.
On the other hand, the independent status Tonga’s FP holds. Unlike, most sovereign states in which FP is determined by government administrations, Tonga’s FP is one that is unwritten and is largely derived directly from the directions of the reigning Monarch. At times such directions have received criticism from the public however, has stood the test of time. Nonetheless, only time will tell how long such policies will remain.
Review:
The chapter has examined how Tonga as a newly independent nation dealt with the responsibility for the conduct of Tonga’s foreign & defence relations through the setup and development of the MINOFA and Tonga Defence Services. Discussions have also highlighted the strategic use of Tonga’s bilateral relations and participation in both regional and international organisations as a means to pursue and achieve Tonga’s national interests and also evaluated the unique foundations for Tonga’s foreign policy. Equally, discussions have highlighted the influential role played by Tonga’s Monarch throughout the 70s to 2010 and ends with the Constitutional and Political reform of 2010.
＜第４章＞ グローバルプレイヤーとしてのトンガ（2010年～2016年）
以下黄色は引用文
トンガの民主化への道のりは長く、波乱に満ちたもので、1980年代に始まった。民主化への努力の集大成は、2010年11月25日に現実のものとなった。トンガ初の民主的な総選挙で、有権者は、「君主ではなく選挙民が選んだ政府」を樹立する代表者を選出した（Powles, 2013, p.1）。
以下の引用は長いが、まさに1970年に独立したトンガ国王に取り入った笹川良一初め多くの世界の詐欺師の動き、そして独立が財政的危機を招き主権ビジネス、即ちパスポート販売などをしなければならなくなった背景がある。
80年代初頭、トンガの統治形態の基礎は特に精査の対象となり、トンガの著名な人民代表の一人であるアキリシ・ポヒヴァ氏53が提起した行動と反対意見により、ポヒヴァ氏の批判は専ら君主制の権力の乱用に焦点を当てたもので、外国籍の人物へのトンガパスポートの海外での違法販売、政府資金の不正使用、縁故主義を指摘した。ポヒヴァ氏の主張は、政府行政への君主制の関与の排除を求め、国民による、国民のための政府樹立という考えを推進した。
独立が越境犯罪を招いた。英国保護時代にはまだ英国の権威、法執行の力が守っていた。
悪い変化としては、犯罪や窃盗、その他の西洋諸国の悪習が、かつて伝統的で孤立した島国であったトンガに浸透したことなどが挙げられる
トンガの民主化と王室の共存の可能性が議論されている。ツポウ５世が私に「民主化を進める。トンガ王室を日本の皇室のような存在にしたい」と言われたことを思い出す。しかし今の皇室と日本国民の関係は２千年近い歴史の結果なのである。トンガ王室の誕生は一千年を超えたであろうか？
2010年の政治的・民主的な変化は、立法議会における国民の意見をより反映させることに主眼が置かれ、国王の権限はトンガ政府の日常的な行政から放棄された。しかし、国王の権限の多くは依然として有効であり、そのため、トンガの外交関係に大きな影響を与えている。おそらく、このような重要な権限を維持することは、トンガの政治的安定が維持され、社会と政府の指導者が国家としてのトンガの運営を完全に統治できる時が来るまで継続されることが必要である。君主の行政権の多くがそのまま残っているため、次に生じる疑問は、両者が共存できるのかということである。
＜第5章：結論＞
歯に絹を着せた表現だが、民主化したトンガ政府の問題点を指摘している。
トンガが民主的に発展を続ける限り、トンガの外交の行方は依然として不透明であり、正しい方向への一歩を踏み出すべきか、それとも単に過去のトンガの先人たちの名声と業績を傷つけることになるのかは、時が経たなければわからない。
しかしツポウ４世が構築したネットワークはトンガサットや笹川の投資話など良い関係ばかりではない。。
タウファアハウ王が世界を歴訪した際に見られる。彼は、単にトンガの名を広めるだけでなく、経済的・社会的ネットワークを構築し、トンガの社会と経済をさらに発展させるためのつながりを築くことを目指していた。
最後に、トンガ外務省の役割の重要性、外交官の技術の向上、そして情報通信の活用をあげている。さらにPSIDSの共通課題として変化を受け入れるには、歴史や文化への悪影響を懸念している。
2017年に書かれたKathleen Nina Tupou女史の修士論文。中国の話が出てこないのは立場上書けないからであろう。今彼女はPrivate Secretary to His Majesty と国王に非常に近い立場にある。
